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Abstract
This paper is a positive analysis of the driving forces in interdisciplinary research.
I take the perspective of a research institution that has to decide how to apply its
resources among the production of two types of knowledge: specialized or interdis-
ciplinary. Using a prize mechanism of compensation, I show that the choice of in-
terdisciplinarity is compatible with prot maximization when the requirement for the
production is su¢ ciently demanding, and when the new interdisciplinary eld is not
too neutral. Productive gains due to complementarities of e¤orts is the main advantage
of interdisciplinary organization.
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1 Introduction
Why interdisciplinary research, considered very interesting and important to achieve break-
throughs, is at the same time so neglected among scientic community? There is few under-
standing of what are the driving forces of the disciplinary pattern in research organizations.
In particular, why it is still so scarce the observation of interdisciplinary research, despite all
emphasis that it receives from policymakers. The present paper brings some potential useful
results in explaining such puzzling situation, by making a positive (rather than normative)
comparison between interdisciplinarity and specialization.
In the context of the current paper, specialization refers to the case where scientists
work separate and independently on their own elds of expertise. This specialized elds
are characterized by well-established and long existent scientic foundations. Foundations
of the modern organization of science are based in secular structures of these di¤erent and
separated disciplines.
Over the years, and especially in the two previous decades, however, it increased the im-
portance attached to an alternative organizational form, interdisciplinarity: the integration
of (already existing) separate disciplines on the development of a new scientic area. Inter-
disciplinarity has been seen as the most suitable way to solve complex questions arising to
societies, as illustrated by The National Academies: "Advances in science and engineering
increasingly require the collaboration of scholars from various elds. This shift is driven by
the urgent need to address complex problems that cut across traditional disciplines, and the
capability of new technologies to both transform existing disciplines and generate new ones."
(National Academies, 2004). Two world-wide recognized examples of interdisciplinarity il-
lustrate how powerful it can be: the development of genomics, a branch of biotechnology
whose roots relate with genetics, molecular biology, analytical chemistry, and informatics;
and the development of neurosciences, a new life science evolving from anatomy, physiology,
biochemistry, and molecular biology of nerves.
Besides the novelty of the eld, interdisciplinarity is also characterized by the requirement
of collaboration between di¤erent experts. Both dening features of interdisciplinarity are
a natural source of di¢ culties. First, when moving from their scholar background into
a new and unexplored discipline, researchers need to adjust to di¤erent languages, tools,
methodologies, and goals. In the present paper, these di¤erences between disciplines are
embody in the concept of scientic distance between elds. A second potential challenge
that interdisciplinarity poses to scientists is the need to cooperate with other scientists, but
having no common disciplinary background.
The empirical study of Porac et al. (2004) may serve to illustrate my theoretical frame-
work. That paper devotes attention to the scientic performance of two teams of researchers,
Astro and Eco. These teams di¤er in the composition and in the disciplinary expertise of
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their members, as well as on their research goal.1 Scientists in Astro have similar scholarly
background and work in the well established eld of Astrophysics. Researchers in Eco come
from di¤erent disciplinary backgrounds and are required to work in modelling ecosystems.
Modelling ecosystems is a relatively new science, emerging from previously separated elds
related with air, water, and land resources. As in my framework, the paper emphasizes the
challenge that Eco team members face to overcome the inherent tensions of the new project.
On the one hand, these tensions relate to the need of balancing "between their individual
discipline-based paradigms and the joint demands of the Alliance work" (pp. 673). In the
language of my framework, this relates with the scientic distance between the background
eld of scientists and the new interdisciplinary eld.2 On the other hand, the members of
the Eco team also identify the need to develop a routine of communication as well a common
language among all members.3
With such distinction between interdisciplinarity and specialization, interdisciplinary re-
search presents a starting cost disadvantage embodied in its own denition. Nevertheless,
when scientists make an extra-investment of adaptation, interdisciplinary di¢ culties may be
reduced (at least partially). Dan Sperber, an anthropologist involved in the interdisciplinary
project "Culture and Cognition" at the University of Michigan recognizes the importance
of such adaptation concern: "Serious involvement in interdisciplinary research needs a high
investment endeavor. To be able to understand each other and conceive of common goals."
(Sperber, 2003). In a static framework as mine, I denominate this investment as the ac-
quisition of adaptative-skills for the researchers. It corresponds to an endeavor of learning
techniques and tools, allowing the researchers to work on the new discipline, in a less costly
way.
Under this framework, I discuss the arguments that lead a research institution to decide
between the two types of organization: specialization and interdisciplinarity. For such, I con-
sider researchers to be perfectly coordinated with their employer organization, an university.
Then, I consider a simple compensation mechanism for the university, a prize, whose rules
are settled by a policymaker.4
1One main di¤erence between my framework and Porac et al. (2004) is that, in their case, the comparison
is between an interdisciplinary and a specialized team. By contrast, I consider that under specialization,
researchers work separate and independently. With such separation, I avoid discussing team e¤ects, in order
to emphasize the issues of coordination and novelty in interdisciplinarity.
2The importance of developing and learning specialized codes in an organization is emphasized in a recent
paper of Crémer et al. (2007).
3By contrast, among Astro team none of these questions were relevant.
4Besides simplicity and linking reward with performance, a mechanism as a prize has two other advantages.
First, it gives policymakers have enough exibility to target prefered areas and methologies. This fact
gives them the possibility to inuence research developments so that they become more aligned with social
preferences. Second, prizes are mechanisms very similar to grants, which are one of the most common used
schemes of rewarding scientic research. The main di¤erence between prizes and grants is their timing. While
grants are usually given prior to the realization of the research, prizes are a reward for the achievement of
2
To emphasize the positive (rather than normative) analysis between interdisciplinarity
and specialization, I analyze two alternative informational settings. The rst, from the
perspective of a policymaker who may allocate funds for one of the two types of organizational
structures. For such, it is possible to consider that either it exists perfect and complete
information between the policymaker and the research organization, or that a policymaker
that has enough exibility in dening the rules for the prizes so that it can still induce the
organization to do the rst-best. The second setting takes the point of view of the university
that owns the resources. The decision of the university regarding which type of research to
implement is inuenced by incentives from the policymaker. In this incentives setting, the
policymaker denes an unique prize rule for both types of research, and is the university who
decides whether it strives for the prize through specialization or through interdisciplinary.
I do consider that the university aims to maximize the net benet of its projects, -
nanced by the policymaker. The net benet maximization goal for the university seems a
reasonable assumption, given that it is a research institution with limited resources (as it
is explicit by the fact that specialization and interdisciplinarity are two disjoint scenarios).
Furthermore, by assuming a research institution that receives public funds, its choice of the
type of knowledge is linked with the social value that such decision can provide to society.
My results show that when the purpose is to produce a high level of output, interdisci-
plinarity is more attractive than specialization. The reason is that interdisciplinarity yields
complementary gains, which are not possible in specialization. This means that even if inter-
disciplinarity involves both researchers for a common output, it may be more e¢ cient than
to have them working separately for independent areas and, in the end, to sum of values
of their separate specialized results. Although interdisciplinarity has a cost disadvantage,
comparing with specialization, it is expectable that dening a production goal su¢ ciently
high, favours the choice of interdisciplinarity. These theoretical predictions are aligned with
the evidence in Porac et al. (2004). There, when comparing the performance pattern of
the two teams, they nd that the joint production (sum of publications) of their members
increases proportionally more in Eco team, the heterogenous group working in a new area.
The results of this paper may, however, be seen from a broader perspective. Rather than
thinking only on scientic research, it is possible to extend some of the ndings to rms,
both on their internal organization, and on their relation with other rms.
Within the rm, the current paper may be useful to study the relation between a principal
(manager) and a group of agents (workers) who can either work separate and independently
in their domains of expertise, or can join expertises and work as a team for a project new for
all of them. In particular, my results show that when the principal cannot enforce the team
a certain performance (ex-post to research). Nevertheless, in the current framework, both timings could be
seen as equivalent, since we are assuming: veriability of levels of output, inexistence of uncertainty during
the research process.
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creation, it is expectable that the agents actually create it, once the goal that the principal
requires is su¢ ciently di¢ cult to be individually obtained.
Considering inter-rms relations, it is also expectable that rms decide to coordinate ef-
forts in a new project, when the gains from cooperation compensate the costs of coordination
and of entrance in a new project.
The theme of interdisciplinarity has some common features with the area of human capital
and production organized by teams. In particular, this literature provides empirical evidence
on an e¤ect that my framework captures, that a higher productivity is often associated with
the heterogeneous composition of the teams (e.g. Van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003; Hamilton
et al., 2003).
My results also have common features with the literature on incentives and coordination
costs, namely with Dessein et al. (2007). Their work considers the trade-o¤ between the
need to standardize and reduce a duplicated activity inside a rm, and the impact that such
change in the organizational structure brings in another related task. As in my question,
their decision is whether to keep activities working separate and independently and not
realize a synergy. Nevertheless, we di¤er on the focus of the argument. They endogenously
condition the optimality of the decision on the distortions that it causes in another related
task, namely in terms of incentives to truth revelation of private information. I assume a
more general framework (that could be used to encompass their argument) where costs of
interdisciplinarity relate with the alternative (rather than sequentially related) scenario of
specialization, but also and above all with coordination problems among di¤erent parties
and with the cost of starting a new, unknown, project.
Despite the above mentioned relation between my paper and the existent literature, up
to my knowledge, there are no theoretical developments on interdisciplinarity, and on its
relations with the organizational structure of institutions through incentives. The current
work is a rst step in lling this gap.
In the next section, I formally present the model and the structure of the game between
the Government and the research institution, a University. In Section 3, I discuss the equilib-
rium results under three alternative settings: when the information between the Government
and the University is perfect and complete; when the choice of the productive inputs and
the acquisition of the adaptative-skills can not be established by contract; and, nally, when
the funding rules for the prizes are restricted to be equal among all scientic elds. In this
last setting, I explicit analyze what are the main arguments in favour of interdisciplinarity,
from the point of view of the research institution. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
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2 The Model
2.1 Specialization and Interdisciplinarity
Let us consider a research institution, call it University, that employs two researchers, each
one with a di¤erent expertise eld. For simplicity, the researchers are perfectly identied
by their own eld, that is, researcher A is an expert in scientic eld A, and researcher
B is an expert in scientic eld B. The two scientic elds are di¤erentiated with respect
to their dening characteristics: object of study, language, tools. For the purpose of the
current analysis model, I aggregate and reduce those characteristics to a single dimension.
Considering such dimension, assume the di¤erence between A and B is measurable and equal
to 1, as Figure 1 shows.
0 1
A B
Figure 1: Scientic distance between the specialized elds.
At the University, the research activity may follow one of the two possible disjoint pat-
terns: specialization or interdisciplinarity.
In the specialized scenario, each researcher i (i = A;B) works separate and independently
on his eld of background, producing an amount Yi of specialized knowledge output, with
Ci. Explicitly:
Yi = ei; (1)
Ci = i  Yi; i = A;B; (2)
where ei 2 R+ is the amount of labor input (e¤ort) spent by researcher i, whereas the cost
coe¢ cient i 2 (0; 1) : Although only the labor input is explicitly included in the knowledge
technology, other factors a¤ecting the production process of Yi can be reected in the value
of i.
The current analysis focus on the perspective of the University, considering it as an
unied structure in terms of goals and objectives. In that sense, instead of referring to two
types of researchers, it would be possible to talk about two di¤erent departments or two
areas of research, perfectly coordinated with the organization. For the purpose of a simpler
exposition, let us keep the reference to two researchers, but not including any informational
problem between them and the University. The following two assumptions serve this purpose.
Assumption 1.1: The labor inputs ei are perfectly observable and veriable between the
University and its researchers.
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Assumption 1.2: The cost coe¢ cients i are publicly known.
As an alternative to have each researcher developing specialized knowledge, the University
may combine the work of both experts, A and B, for the development of a new scientic
discipline, eld I. In terms of the conjectural dimension for the scientic elds, the new
interdisciplinary I lies between the two areas from which it emerges. As Figure 2 represents,
I assume that the new I is located at a distance  from eld A and at a distance (1  )
from eld B, with  2 (0; 1) :
0 1
A B
ρ
I
Figure 2: Relative position of the interdiciplinary eld I.
Being a location characteristic,  is a basic feature to identify the new eld I: In the
present setting, it is assumed to be an exogenous parameter. The interdisciplinary production
relies on the collaboration of the two di¤erent experts. The contribution of each participant
is proportional to the distance between his background eld and the new I : the closer he
is from I, the more important is his expertise for the production of I: Considering this
complementarity property, the production of the interdisciplinary output, YI ; is described
by the following technology:
YI =   e1 AI  eBI ; (3)
where  2 R+ is a scaling technological parameter and eiI identies the amount of labour
input of researcher i to output I.
Given the relative distribution of the three scientic elds and the way it is related with
the parameter ; it is possible to center the analysis on the case of  2  0; 1
2

, that is, on
the case where researcher A is the closest to I: The generalization for the remaining domain
of  is straightforward. Only punctually, and when opportune, I emphasize the symmetric
case of  2  1
2
; 1

; or the even situation of  = 1
2
:
For the University, the cost of producing interdisciplinary output reects, on the one
hand, the opportunity cost of the resources employed in production, eAI and eBI , and, on
the other hand, the di¢ culties underlying the development of a new and unexplored eld.
These di¢ culties may, however, decrease if there is an extra-involvement of the researchers,
that is, if the University invests in the adaptative-skills of its workers. Inspired in the concept
of individuals innovative behavior of Van der Vegt & Janssen (2003), I dene the adaptative-
skills of a researcher as the intentional exercise of intellectual exibility, in order to decrease
the individual marginal cost of working in the interdisciplinary eld. The acquisition of
these skills describes, on a static framework as the current one, the process of learning the
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basic characteristics (language, tools) of the new eld. Once such investment is made, the
researcher is able to work on the new eld in a less costly way. A binary variable i identies
whether researcher i (i = A;B) acquires such adaptative-skills (i = 1) or not (i = 0) :
Considering these characteristics, the cost of the University to produce interdisciplinary
research can, then, be formulated as:
CI =

+ A
1  

(1  A) eAI +

1  + B


(1  (1  ) B) eBI + 
1  A +
1  

B:
(4)
This formalization makes explicit that the acquisition of adaptative-skills for researcher i
reduces his marginal cost of e¤ort: for researcher A from

+A
1 

to (+ A) ; and for
researcher B from

1 +B


to (1  + B). Let mi be the marginal cost of ei before the
investment in his adaptative-skills, i.e., mA =
+A
1  and mB =
1 +B

: The function (4) can
be re-written as:
CI = mA (1  A) eAI +mB (1  (1  ) B) eBI + 
1  A +
1  

B: (5)
The rst two terms in the cost function refer to the cost of the inputs eiI : I refer to them as
the productive cost. The higher the scientic distance between the original eld of researcher
i and the new eld I; the higher the productive cost: By mA and mB; the marginal cost of
e¤ort for researcher A is then increasing with ; whereas the marginal cost of e¤ort B is
decreasing with : The investment in the adaptative-skills, i = 1; decreases the marginal
cost of eiI :
To benet from adaptative-skills it is necessary to invest on them. The last two terms in
function (5) reect the cost of these investments. I assume the cost of acquiring adaptative-
skills is proportional to the distance :
Comparing both benets and costs of acquiring the adaptative-skills, it is possible to
establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 A University interested in minimizing the cost of producing interdisciplinary
research, invests in the adaptative-skills of a researcher only when it employs a su¢ ciently
large amount of his labor input: it invests on adaptative-skills of researcher A when eAI 
1
+A
, and of researcher B when eBI  11 +B :
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2.2 The Value of Knowledge and the Reward System
Let us consider the existence of a government (the Government), with an endowment of G
monetary resources (exogenous in the current setting). The University may receive these
resources through a mechanism of prizes. Acting as an advocate for society, the role of the
Government is to dene the monetary amount of the prize in each eld i; gi (i = A;B; I),
as well as the criterion and respective threshold that the University must fulll in order to
receive that prize. The criterion to receive the prize is unique and dened in terms of a
requirement of minimum output ~yi: This means that the University receives gi monetary
units, if its production in eld i is at least ~yi. Following what is common in the literature,
this required minimum performance may also be denominated as the standard (e.g. Costrell,
1994; or Betts, 1998).
Being aware, not only of a budget constraint of G monetary units, but also that special-
ization and interdisciplinarity are two disjoint scenarios, the problem of the Government in
choosing the funding rules is, then, dened as follows.
G1) In the specialized scenario,
max
(gi;~yi)i=A;B
VAB [YA (gA; ~yA) ; YB (gB; ~yB)]
s:t:

gA + gB  G;
univ  0;
where Yi (gi; ~yi) is the knowledge produced by the University in eld i (i = A;B),
function of the funding rules for eld i, and VAB measures the social value of the
specialized outputs. Since the welfare function VAB captures the benets that
knowledge brings to the society, I assume it is increasing in its arguments, that
is, @VAB
@Yi
> 0: For simplicity, I assume additive separability in the social value of
the specialized elds:
VAB [YA (gA; ~yA) ; YB (gB; ~yB)] = VA [YA (gA; ~yA)] + VB [YB (gB; ~yB)] ;
where the social value of each specialization is given by an increasing and concave
function: V 0i > 0; V
00
i  0: The generic specication of Vi is compatible with the
possibility of A and B being di¤erently important for society.
G2) In the interdisciplinary scenario,
max
(gI ;~yI)
VI [YI (gI ; ~yI)]
s:t:

gI  G;
univ  0;
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where YI (gI ; ~yI) is the knowledge produced by the University in eld I, function
of the funding rules for eld I, and VI the social value of interdisciplinary research.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume @VI
@YI
> 0:
After knowing the funding rules dened by the Government, the problem of the University
can be seen in two stages:
- rst, to decide the type of research to be developed, that is, whether the researchers
should produce specialized knowledges A and B, collaborate in the interdisciplinary
eld I, or should not produce any research at all (this outside option is assumed to
yield zero prot);
- second, to choose the amount of resources to employ in each type of research.
U1) In case of specialization, the amount of labor used in each project (eA; eB) solves
max
(eA;eB)
X
i=A;B
gi   Ci(ei)
s:t: gi > 0 only if Yi(ei)  ~yi , i = A;B;
U2) In case of interdisciplinarity, the amount of inputs employed in the new eld
I (eAI ; eBI), and the investment in the adaptative-skills of the researchers (A; B)
in order to
max
(eAI ;eBI ;A;B)
gI   CI(eAI ; eBI ; A; B)
s:t: gI > 0 only if YI(eAI ; eBI)  ~yI :
Without introducing any uncertainty for the outputs and for the rewards, as well as
assuming full commitment from both participants, Government and University, the timing of
the game is completely described by a two stages sequence: rst, the Government announces
the funding rules (gi; ~yi) ; i = A;B; I; second, the University decides on the type of research,
on the amount of productive resources, and on the acquisition of the adaptative-skills.
The predictions of the model are presented in the following section, where three alter-
native informational contexts are analyzed. The rst, the benchmark situation, deals with
complete and perfect information among the Government and the University, as well as no
restriction in the funding rules. This means that, when dening the rules for the prizes,
the Government is able to delineate all the decisions of the University. In the second sce-
nario,there is the introduction of non-contractibility on the choice of the inputs and on the
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acquisition of adaptative-skills. I analyze what is the expected equilibrium in this moral-
hazard scenario, and how it is a¤ected by the existence of distinct funding rules per eld.
In the last setting, imposing the restriction of a unique funding policy for all the three sci-
entic elds, I extend the moral-hazard problem to the choice of the type of research. I
then discuss the reasons underlying the preferences of the University between specialization
and interdisciplinarity. In all these three contexts, I apply the solution concept of Sub-game
Perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 The Equilibrium
3.1 The Benchmark
Consider rst that there is complete and perfect information between the Government and
the University. With all the research choice variables being contractible, the Government
decides: whether it asks the University to undertake the specialized research or interdis-
ciplinarity, what is the amount of the labor inputs that should be employed in each type
of research, and in the case of interdisciplinarity whether there is an investment in the
adaptative-skills of the researchers. Given the budget restriction of G monetary units, the
Government establishes the value of the prize for each eld, ensuring that the University is
willing to participate in such contract.
Backward induction leads us to the optimal solution. Thus, let us proceed analyzing
the result for each type of research. At the end, the comparison of both specialization and
interdisciplinary scenarios, allows to conclude which is socially preferred.
Proposition 3.1 Assuming complete and perfect information between the Government and
the University, the social optimal solution for the specialized research satises the following
conditions:
i) relative marginal benet equals to relative marginal cost
@vA
@YA
(eA)
@vB
@YB
(eB)
=
A
B
; (6)
ii) zero-prot for the University
i (gi; ei) = 0, i = A;B; (7)
10
iii) exhausting of Governmental budget
gA + gB = G: (8)
When the decision is for specialization, e¢ ciency drives to the exhausting budget condi-
tion (8), since no alternative use is considered for the monetary resources G: With a higher
prize, the University is willing to employ more (costly) resources ei. Nevertheless, due to the
symmetry of information, the Government is able to exactly compensate the University for
its production costs. Thus, the optimal level of production for the specialized projects yields
zero prot for the University, the same as its outside option, according to (7). This result
links the monetary value of the prizes with the amount of resources spent in production.
Due to the budget constraint, an increase in the production of one specialized output
translates in a reduction of the other specialization. From condition (6), and as expected,
the optimal solution for society equates the relative marginal benet of each knowledge with
its relative marginal cost.
Denote by ei the optimal inputs level of input that is obtained from the previous proposi-
tion, and by yi the associated knowledge production, i = A;B: The maximum social welfare
under this choice for the specialized research then comes as V AB =
P
i=A;B Vi (y

i ) :
For the alternative interdisciplinary scenario, it is possible to anticipate that some of
the previous results remain valid. In the social optimum solution, both arguments of e¢ -
ciency and symmetry of information still apply and, hence, both results of budget constraint
exhaustion and zero prot are binding.
Di¤ering from the specialized scenario, however, the social welfare function VI is increas-
ing in only one argument, YI ; which enable us to derive explicit functions for the optimal
level of the inputs. The best decision concerning the investment on the adaptative-skills of
the researchers follows in a straightforward way.
Proposition 3.2 Assuming complete and perfect information between the Government and
the University, the social optimal interdisciplinary solution is dened by:
eAI =
gI   1 A   1  B
mA  (1  A)  1(1 )
; (9)
eBI =
gI   1 A   1  B
mB  [1  (1  ) B]  1
; (10)
I (gI ; e

AI ; e

BI ; A; B) = 0; (11)
gI = G; (12)
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and, therefore, the associated social optimal interdisciplinary output is
yI (A; B) = 
G  
1 A   1  B
m1 A m

B

1 A
1 
1  
1 (1 )B

 : (13)
The social optimal investment on the adaptative-skills of the researchers depends positively
on the monetary resources G: For  2  0; 1
2

; the explicit conditions for optimal (A; B) are:
(A; 

B) =
8>><>>:
(0; 0) when 0  G  
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] ;
(1; 0) when 
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ]  G 
1 
(1 ) +

1  ;
(1; 1) when G  1 
(1 ) +

1  :
Because the social optimal interdisciplinary solution maximizes the output YI , the invest-
ment on the adaptative-skills should only be made when it induces an increase on YI : For a
small budget G, the best option is to spent it only on the productive inputs and not on the
adaptative-skills. At an intermediate level of G, it pays to invest in one of the researchers,
the closest to I; who is collaborating more in production and has the smallest cost to acquire
the adaptative-skills.5 For a su¢ ciently high budget, the welfare maximizing decision is to
invest in both adaptative-skills. Formally, the conditions for optimal (A; B) come from
the upper-envelope curve of yI (A; B), considering the di¤erent possible combinations of
(A; B) : It is then possible to depict the optimal interdisciplinary production as a function
of G (please refer to Figure 3).
G
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Figure 3: Social optimal interdisciplinary output, for  2  0; 1
2

.
5This means that for  2  0; 12 researcher A should have adaptative-skills, for  2   12 ; 1 researcher B is
the chosen one, and for  = 12 it is indi¤erent whether the acquisition is for A or B (but not both).
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Some comparative statics results follow from the previous proposition.
Corollary 3.1 The optimal involvement of a researcher i in the common project, eiI (i =
A;B) increases when: i) his cost coe¢ cient i decreases, or ii) he acquires adaptative-
skills (i = 1) :When the other researcher j acquires adaptative-skills (j = 1) ; eiI decreases,
j 6= i: For  2  0; 1
2

; a marginal increase in  : i) has a negative impact on eAI when the
optimal decision on adaptative-skills is (A; 

B) = (0; 0) or (

A; 

B) = (1; 0), and when
(A; 

B) = (1; 1) for G >
1 22
2
; ii) has a positive impact on eBI , when the combination
(A; B) is the optimal one.
When the productive marginal cost of a researcher increases through i, the optimal
solution requires that is marginal benet also increases. Since is marginal benet is de-
creasing in eiI , I obtain that his optimal level of collaboration on interdisciplinarity decreases,
@eiI
@i
< 0.
The acquisition of adaptative-skills has a double e¤ect. On the one hand, the investment
on such skills lowers the budget available to compensate the employment of inputs, decreasing
eiI : On the other hand, the researcher acquiring the adaptative-skills lowers his productive
marginal cost, and therefore he should work more on the common project. At the optimal
combination (A; 

B) : for the researcher acquiring the adaptative-skills, it dominates the
decreasing marginal cost e¤ect and, therefore, @e

iI
@i
> 0;for the other researcher, however, it
only exists the negative e¤ect of a smaller budget, resulting in
@ejI
@i
< 0 (or, equivalently,
@eiI
@j
< 0).
When  2  0; 1
2

and it increases marginally (meaning that after the change,  is still
in the same interval) two e¤ects happen. First, As e¤ort becomes more costly. Second,
it increases the cost of investing in As adaptative-skills, reducing the budget available to
remunerate the productive e¤orts. Both e¤ects have a negative impact on eAI and, therefore,
@eAI
@
(A; 

B) < 0: By opposite argument, as  increases, I becomes closer to B and, hence,
it is optimal to increase eBI ; i.e.,
@eBI
@
(A; 

B) > 0: When (

A; 

B) = (1; 1) the condition of
G > 1 2
2
2
ensures that the increase in the available budget due to a smaller cost of investing
in Bs adaptative-skills is not su¢ ciently powerful to invert the sign of @e

AI
@
:
From the previous proposition, it is also possible to derive some results of comparative
statics for the optimal interdisciplinary production.
Corollary 3.2 The optimal interdisciplinary production level, yI ; decreases with an increase
of is cost coe¢ cient, i; i = A;B. For  2
 
0; 1
2

and A = B = ; a marginal increase
in  decreases yI : i) when (

A; 

B) = (0; 0) ; or (1; 1) ; ii) or when (

A; 

B) = (1; 0) and the
researcher B has a high relative marginal cost, that is, log

mB
mA
 1


> 1  1
mA
+ 1
mB
+ 1
(1 ) :
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As it follows from the negative relation between eiI and i, whenever the productive
marginal cost of at least one of the researchers increases, the maximum possible output
decreases, @y

I
@i
< 0:
The response of yI to a change in  is ambiguous, since  has opposite e¤ects on both e

AI
and eBI , and also because  denes the importance of each researcher in the interdisciplinary
production technology (3). Nevertheless, when researchers have equal cost coe¢ cients, A =
B = ; and researcher Bs relative marginal cost is su¢ ciently high, I may anticipate that
a marginal increase in  has a negative impact on yI ; as Figure 4 shows. Intuitively, when 
gets closer to 1
2
; and because As collaboration is still more relevant for the interdisciplinary
production, the increase in his cost is not totally compensated by the decrease in Bs cost.
As a result, the optimal output level decreases.
G
),(* BAIy qq
0
( )0,0*Iy
( )0,1*Iy
( )1,1*Iy
Figure 4: How yI changes when  increases, for  2
 
0; 1
2

:
When yI (1; 0) ; the lack of ambiguity is only solved for a researcher B with su¢ ciently
high marginal cost, that is, for log

mB
mA
1


> 1  1
mA
+ 1
mB
+ 1
(1 ) : This condition guarantees
that the negative impact that  has on eAI dominates over the positive e¤ect that it has on
eBI : To better understand the need for this condition, notice that at the starting situation,
A has a relatively higher participation in the production process than B. This is due to
eld I being closer to A,  2  0; 1
2

; and because A is less costly in production than B,
by (A; B) = (1; 0) and A = B = . When A collaborates more, the interdisciplinary
technology (Cobb-Douglas) claims that I are less willing to give up of Bs participation.
Therefore the ambiguity of s impact over yI only vanishes when Bs collaboration is very
small, so that the negative impact of @e

AI
@
dominates over the positive impact of @e

BI
@
: A
su¢ ciently high productive marginal cost for researcher B ensures that small collaboration.
14
With the social optimal interdisciplinary production dened by the previous proposition,
it is possible to represent the interdisciplinary social value by V I (y

I ) : It follows that, for
a given G; the social optimal decision is to have interdisciplinarity whenever V I (y

I ) 
V AB (y

A; y

B) : As modeled, the functions V reect the benets for society from each type
of research. Without entering in a normative comparison of such benets, it is possible
to advance that di¤erent types of interdisciplinarity (here reected in the value of ) may
lead to di¤erent social optimal decisions. In fact, as latter is made explicit, a more central
interdisciplinarity may be too costly to undertake.
3.2 When resources and adaptative-skills are non-contractible
In a scenario where only the research output, knowledge, is veriable and contractible
through the rules of the prizes, the specialization alternative remains the same as before. In
fact, given the technological specication of the specialized scenario in (1), it is equivalent
to contract on the research output or on the productive e¤orts. In terms of interdisci-
plinarity, however, the non-veriability of the productive e¤orts and of the acquisition of
adaptative-skills could have an impact on the equilibrium predictions. Nevertheless, if the
Government may dene rules for the prizes that di¤er between elds, it benets from su¢ -
ciently high exibility on choosing between interdisciplinarity and specialization, and is still
able to implement its rst-best solution. This section shows how the formalization goes in
this informational context.
When dening the rules for the prizes, the Government makes the monetary values gi;
i = A;B; I; to be conditional on the production level, ~yi: Because (gi; ~yi) may di¤er between
elds, the Government This means that the choice variables of the Government are now:
rst, the type of research, specialization or interdisciplinarity; second, the funding rules for
specialization (gA; ~yA) and (gB; ~yB) ; and the funding rules for interdisciplinarity (gI ; ~yI) :
Once accepting the proposal of the Government, and facing a discrete-type of reward
(getting or not the prize), the University decides on the resources spent and on the investment
in the adaptative-skills. Because there is no extra-benet of producing above the required
standard, a prot maximizer institution seeks the most e¢ cient way of producing, at most,
that level.6
Proposition 3.3 Given the funding policy for eld i; (~yi; gi) ; i = A;B; I; the best choice
for the University is:
a) under specialization
eUi = ~yi , i = A;B; (14)
6This conclusion is also in line with Result 1 of Betts (1998).
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b) under interdisciplinarity8<: e
U
AI = ~yI 
h
mB
mA


1 
1 A

1 (1 )B

i
 1

;
eUBI = ~yI 
h
mA
mB



1 (1 )B

1 A
1 
i1 
 1

:
(15)
The investment in the adaptative-skills is increasing in both policy variables, ~yI and
gI : for smaller values gI and ~yI ; the University prefers not to acquire any adaptative-
skills; for intermediate gI and ~yI ; it invests in the researcher that is closer to eld I;
and for high values of gI and ~yI ; it acquires both adaptative-skills. When  2
 
0; 1
2

;
the relevant thresholds for acquiring adaptative-skills of A are (~yI ; gI) = (~y00I ; g
00
I ) =
= (m 1A m
 
B


1 



1
1 
1 
  1
 1
; 
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] )
and for the adaptative - skills of B are (~yI ; gI) = (~y10I ; g
10
I ) =
= (m 1A m
 
B

1 

 h
1


  1
i 1
; (1 )
2+2(1 )
(1 )(1 ) ):
The outside option of no research is preferred: i) to specialization when the standard ~yi
is at least gi
i
, i = A;B; ii) and to interdisciplinarity when ~yI is at least
~y11I = m
 1
A m
 
B

gI   1    1 

.
As in the benchmark situation, the acquisition of the adaptative-skills depends positively
on the amount of funds available for the interdisciplinary project. Having to choose how
to spend the funds, the priority is to remunerate the inputs necessary to produce and, only
after, to invest in more e¢ cient ways of producing.
More interesting is to notice that, even if the prize gI allows to acquire adaptative-
skills, the optimal decision is contingent on ~yI : As the required production increases, it also
increases the e¤ort the researchers must exert to accomplish it. But the higher the e¤ort, the
higher the benets of acquiring adaptative-skills. Thus, only when the policy is su¢ ciently
demanding, the investment is made. This result follows from Lemma 2.1 . Formally, I can
derive the conditions for Universitys best choice (A; B) through the upper envelope-curve
of the prot curves UI (A; B), when considering the di¤erent possible combinations of
(A; B) : Figure 5 illustrates the reasoning, plotting the maximum interdisciplinary prot
of the University as a function of the standard ~yI . The gure stands for the case of a prize
su¢ ciently high to allow the acquisition of skills for both researchers, i.e., gI  g10I .
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Figure 5: Maximum interdisciplinary prot, for  2  0; 1
2

:
From the solution of the interdisciplinary problem stated in Proposition 3.3, it is possible
to derive some comparative statics results.
Corollary 3.3 At the optimal solution for the University, the e¤ort of researcher i in the
interdisciplinary project, eUiI ; increases when: i) his cost coe¢ cient i decreases, or the cost
coe¢ cient of the other researcher j increases, ii) he acquires adaptative-skills (i = 1), or
the other expert does not (j = 0), j 6= i. A negative relation between eUAI and  is guaranteed
when (1 A)mA
[1 (1 )B ]mB >
1 

:
To produce the required ~yI at the most e¢ cient way, whenever the productive marginal
cost of one expert decreases, the University should increase his contribution for the common
project, so that @e
U
iI
@i
< 0. By a similar argument, and using the complementary characteristic
of interdisciplinarity, i should work more when js marginal cost increases, @e
U
iI
@j
> 0. Since
the productive marginal cost of the researchers depends negatively on the acquisition of the
adaptative-skills, in the optimal solution @e
U
iI
@i
> 0 and @e
U
iI
@j
< 0: Regarding the impact of the
distance parameter  on the level of e¤orts chosen by the University, opposite e¤ects emerge.
Because  determines not only the cost of producing the interdisciplinary output, but also
the process of production itself, ambiguity is solved when the relative marginal cost of eAI is
higher than the relative importance of eAI for the interdisciplinary production. Under such
restriction, a negative relation between eUAI and  stands out.
Corollary 3.4 Given the funding policy of the Government for interdisciplinarity (~yI ; gI) ;
the maximum prot that the University may obtain with this type of research, conditional on
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the acquisition or not of the adaptative-skills, is given by
UI (A; B) = gI  

1  A  
1  

B   ~yI

 [mA (1  A)]1  
 [mB (1  (1  ) B)] 
"
1  


+


1  
1 #
;
which increases with: i) a higher value of the prize, gI ; and ii) a smaller productive marginal
cost for the researchers; i.
When  2  0; 1
2

and A = B = ; a marginal increase in  decreases UI (A; B), when
i) (A; B) = (0; 0) ; ii) (A; B) = (1; 0) and log

mB
mA

> 
1 + ; or iii) (A; B) = (1; 1)
and log

mB
mA

>  2 + 1+
1 +   1++ + ~yI 
1
2
  1
(1 )2
mBm
1 
A
:
The achievement of a given standard, at a higher productive marginal costs, necessarily
leads to a smaller interdisciplinary prot, meaning that @
U
I
@i
(A; B) < 0: Considering the
e¤ect of  in the interdisciplinary prot, the conclusion is ambiguous for general values of the
parameters. Nevertheless, when A = B =  and the researcher B (the researcher furthest
from I) is su¢ ciently costly, I may conclude that @
MU
I
@
(A; B) < 0:
In the particular setting of our analysis, two characteristics have a signicative role for
the results. First, the lack of incentive of the University to exceed the standard o¤sets
the potential asymmetric information problem. Second, since the funding rules may di¤er
between elds, the Government has enough exibility to implement the rst-best solution.
Corollary 3.5 Let (eA; eB) and (A; B) be non-veriable. Assuming that the Government
can choose di¤erent funding policies (~yi; gi) for each eld i (i = A;B; I) ; it is still possible
to achieve the rst-best solution. Then, the funding rules for the specialized projects must be
~yA = y

A; ~yB = y

B; gA = A  yA; and gB = B  yB; whereas for the interdisciplinary research
~yI (A; B) = y

I (A; B) ; and gI = G:
7
The nal decision of which type of research must be contracted follows from the compar-
ison of the maximum social welfare on both situations. Interdisciplinarity is the best choice
for society when VI (~yI)  VAB (~yA; ~yB) :
7The symbol () means that the value of the variables is the same as in rst-best (please refer to the
benchmark model, Propositions 3.1 and 3.2).
18
3.3 When the funding policy is restricted
Suppose now that the type of research to implement is now a decision of the University. From
the previous setting, let us maintain the assumption of non-contractibility of the amount of
resources (eA; eB) and of the investment in the adaptative-skills (A; B). The distinction is
that now that the Government decision variables are restricted to a funding rule, common
to the three scientic disciplines: (~yi; gi) = (~y; g) ; i = A;B; I: As a consequence, the timing
of decisions is:
1. the Government chooses the unique funding rule (~y; g) ;
2. once knowing the rule, the University decides,
i) whether the researchers work separately on their specialized elds, collaborate
with each other on the interdisciplinary eld I; or undertake the alternative out-
side option of no research;
ii) the amount of resources to employ in the research, and the acquisition of the
adaptative-skills.
At a rst glance, it may seem that specialization is being favoured by the funding rule,
since it enables the University to receive 2g, whereas interdisciplinarity, at most, yields g.
Specialization can, therefore, appear as the obvious choice for the University. As I show, it
is not always so. Interdisciplinary research can still be the best option for a prot maximizer
organization.
In order to centralize our discussion on the comparison between specialization and inter-
disciplinarity, rather than in potential asymmetries of costs between the two original elds
A and B; I use the following assumption:
Assumption 2: Let the researchers have equal cost coe¢ cients, i.e., A = B = :
Our main results remain valid under more general conditions. In the end of this section,
I briey comment the case of A 6= B:
The comparison between the protability of the two types of research depends on the
value of the parameters, but the two following propositions stand out the main results.
Proposition 3.4 Let the governmental funding policy be dened per scientic project, and
common to all elds, i.e., (~yi; gi) = (~y; g) ; i = A;B; I: Then, the University prefers to
develop the interdisciplinary research when the required standard is su¢ ciently high.
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I start by illustrating the reasoning using a graph. The relative position of the two
prot curves, under specialization and under interdisciplinarity, depends on the value of
parameters. As such, Figure 6 considers the case of 2
m1 A m

B
2 (1 [2 (2 ) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2 ;
(1 )[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
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Figure 6: Specialized prot (AB) and interdisciplinary prot (I), for  2
 
0; 1
2

:
When the requirement of production is small (below ~y10AB;I), the cost of joining both
researchers in a unique project on a new area, where both have to go native, does not
compensate the reward that the organization may receive. Deciding to keep both researchers
working in two independent areas, the ones where they are experts, and applying for two
separate prizes, turns to be the most rewarding option.
When the funding policy is su¢ ciently demanding (above ~y10AB;I), the conclusion reverses.
A larger output level is less costly to produce when the University combines the work of the
two di¤erent experts. Complementarity generates productivity gains that are not possible to
achieve under specialization. This cooperative advantage is reinforced by a potential smaller
cost due to the acquisition of adaptative-skills. Together, for a su¢ ciently high production
level, these two characteristics result in such a smaller cost for interdisciplinary research that
more than compensates its initial disfavored position on the reward scheme.
Although interdisciplinarity may be a better option than specialization for a standard
above ~y10AB;I ; when the requirement is too much demanding (higher than ~y
11); the University
prefers not to apply to any prize at all.
From the previous analysis, it is possible to infer that the comparison between the prof-
itability of each type of research depends on the value of the parameters. The comparative
statistic result then follows.
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Proposition 3.5 Let (eA; eB) and (A; B) be non-contractible and the funding policy (~y; g)
be unique for all possible elds. Then, under Assumption 2 and  2  0; 1
2

:
a) an increase in the researchers cost coe¢ cient, ; favors the choice for interdiscipli-
narity;
b) an increase in  favors the choice for specialization, when the relative marginal cost
of researcher B is su¢ ciently high, i.e., when: i) log

mB
mA

> 
1 + if the optimal
(A; B) = (1; 0) ; and ii) log

mB
mA

>  2 + 1+
1 +   1+++ ~yI 
1
2
  1
(1 )2
mBm
1 
A
if the optimal
(A; B) = (1; 1) :
Because the coe¢ cient  stands for the productive marginal cost of the researchers, it
a¤ects both interdisciplinarity and specialization. When outputs are separately produced,
as in the specialized scenario, an increase in the individual marginal cost a¤ects the cost
structures of both elds A and B, in a direct proportion to researcherse¤ort. When both
researchers interact, though, the change leads to a reallocation on the individual contribu-
tions for the common project I. As a result, interdisciplinary research is less penalized by
an increase in .
The distance parameter  is only relevant for the interdisciplinary option, but it inuences
in several opposite ways. On the one hand, when  2  0; 1
2

and it increases marginally, it
becomes more costly for A to collaborate in the production and to acquire adaptative-skills.
For researcher B the impact is reversed, thus creating an ambiguity on the interdiscipli-
nary prot. When Bs relative marginal cost is su¢ ciently high, his collaboration in the
common project is small enough to guarantee that As negative result dominates. Intu-
itively, whenever  gets closer to 1
2
; but still Bs higher familiarity with the new discipline
does not compensates As higher di¢ culty, interdisciplinarity becomes less interesting for
the University.
3.3.1 Restricted funding policy and A 6= B
Let us now discuss how the previous conclusions regarding the choice of the University
changes, when the two specialized elds A and B have di¤erent cost coe¢ cients. Consider
the case A > B : A = B,  > 1:
As far as the specialized projects are concerned, the maximum value of ~y that makes the
University indi¤erent between participating or not, is now di¤erent for each eld. In fact,
until ~y = g
B
the University is willing to develop specialized output B, but it produces output
A only if ~y  g
A
: For such case of interest, A > B; this means that when the required
standard is su¢ ciently high, only the specialized eld B is relevant for the University. Figure
7 illustrates the argument.
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Figure 7: Specialized prot when A > B:
To compare the maximum prot of the University under specialization and under inter-
disciplinarity, I have to consider that B alone may be a relevant choice. Despite this new fact,
Proposition 3.4 still holds, since the University still prefers to develop the interdisciplinary
research when the required standard ~y is su¢ ciently high.
Regarding Proposition 3.5, the impact that an increase in the marginal cost of one of the
specialized elds, i (i = A;B) ; has on the choice between specialization and interdiscipli-
narity is now dependent on the distance parameter, .
Proposition 3.6 Let (eA; eB) and (A; B) be non-contractible and the funding policy (~y; g)
be unique for all possible elds. Assume di¤erent cost coe¢ cients, such that A > B: Then,
a) in the case where the specialization in eld B, alone, is never an optimal choice for the
University, the impact that an increase in i has on the choice between specialization
and interdisciplinarity depends on  : i) an increase on A favors interdisciplinarity if
1+A
B
> 1 

; ii) and increase on B favors interdisciplinarity if 1+BA >

1  ;
b) in the case where the specialization in eld B, alone, may be an optimal choice for the
University: i) an increase in A enlarges the range of the standard ~y where only B
is chosen, making interdisciplinarity less interesting for the University; ii) an increase
in B has the opposite e¤ect, that is, it favours the choice of interdisciplinarity, when
 > 1


mA
mB
1 
:
Changing ; and therefore the location of eld I; has similar results to the ones described
in Proposition 3.5.
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4 Concluding remarks
Interdisciplinarity, the development of a new scientic discipline with foundations in well-
established disciplines, has recently gain visibility as a promising way of solving complex
questions of societies. Despite this renowned importance that is assigned to interdisciplinar-
ity, scholars and scientic institutions do not always share this enthusiasm when deciding
the allocation of research resources. This paper shows that under a horizontal di¤erentia-
tion of scientic expertises it is e¢ cient to combine them in a new eld, when the resulting
complementary gains compensate the entrance and coordination costs. When the goal to
achieve is minor, it is better that each researcher works separate and independently in his
expertise eld. Nevertheless, when the goal is su¢ ciently audacious, the productive gains
from cooperation make interdisciplinarity a more benec pattern than specialization.
In this paper I take the perspective of a research organization, an university, whose
activities receive a reward from a policymaker, a government, in the form of prizes. In this
case, the university seeks to match at most the required standard, since it has no extra-reward
from producing above it. The rst-best solution is achievable whenever the type of research
is contractible and the funding rules di¤er between elds. The acquisition of adaptative-skills
is optimal, not only when the value of the prize is su¢ cient to pay for such investment, but
also when the saving in cost that they allow, compensates the investment. The acquisition
of the adaptative-skills is, then, conditional on a high interdisciplinary production.
When the government is restricted to establish a unique funding rule, common to all
elds, the type of research is decided by the university. It may seem that specialization is
favored, due to its potential higher revenue and less disadvantaged cost structure. Never-
theless, when the required production is su¢ ciently high to benet from complementarity
gains in production. An excessively high production requirement, however, discourages the
development of any type of research.
Besides gains from complementary inputs, the preference of the university for interdis-
ciplinarity is also a¤ected by two other factors. First, the cost of the traditional elds.
Higher cost makes both specialized and interdisciplinary research more expensive. Due to
the presence of complementarity in interdisciplinary production, it is possible to reallocate
the contribution of each research. This is, however, not possible for specialization, which
makes interdisciplinarity relatively favored by an increase in these innate costs. In other
words, my result shows that institutions with higher costs, thus less e¢ cient in produc-
ing the traditional elds of research, may consider interdisciplinarity as a more interesting
option. Second, and conversely, when the interdisciplinary eld is more central and none re-
searcher is particularly familiar with it, specialization is a better alternative for the research
institution. In this case, the increase in the cost of the e¤ort of the closest researcher, and
therefore also the one whose involvement is more important, may be too high.
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The results in this paper can be applied to a broader range of problems. In particular, it
is possible to link them to the organizational structure of rms. From an internal perspective,
our results may be applied to a rm that faces the possibility to have two units operating
separate and independently in two known domains, or to coordinate them in a new one.
The present work may also be linked with problems in merger of rms, when merging
involves the exploration of a new area business, with which none of the partners is familiar.
The aim of this paper is not to discuss organizational or informational issues between
the employer organization, the university, and its workers. By denition, interdisciplinarity
relies on the collaboration between di¤erent researchers, with di¤erent scientic backgrounds.
Conict of interests may then arise within the interdisciplinary group, making relevant the
design not only of the internal organization among researchers, but also of the relation
between the group and the host-research institution. In future work, I plan to develop these
issues.
It is worthy emphasizing the pertinent conclusion that interdisciplinarity may be an
interesting option for research institutions, once the cost of opening the new scientic path
is overcome. Besides the support that policymakers can give to institutions, ensuring the
monetary means to face this cost, their role is crucial to guarantee that the performance
required is su¢ ciently high to be worth going through di¢ culties.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1. By the denition of the interdisciplinary cost CI in (5), if there is
no acquisition of adaptative-skills of researcher A, the cost of the interdisciplinary project
is:
CI = mAeA +mB [1  (1  ) B] eB + 1  

B:
When there is an investment in As adaptative-skills:
CI = (+ A)eA +mB [1  (1  ) B] eB + 
1   +
1  

B:
Comparing both situations, it is cost minimizing to invest in As adaptative-skills i¤:
eA  1
+ A
:
Similar reasoning can be developed for the adaptative-skills of B.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In the benchmark situation, when the Government asks
for specialized research, the problem may be formalized as:
max
(eA;eB ;gA;gB)
VAB =
X
i=A;B
Vi [Yi (ei)]
s:t:

i = gi   Ci (ei)  0; i = A;B;
gA + gB  G;
where the production functions Yi (ei) and the cost functions Ci (ei) are given by (1) and
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(2), respectively. The rst-order conditions are:8>>>>><>>>>>:
@Vi
@Yi
@Yi
@ei
(ei) = ii;
i = 3;
i (gi   iei) = 0;
3 (gA + gB  G) = 0;
i  0; 3  0;
i = A;B;
where i is the Lagrangian-multiplier associated with the participation constraint on spe-
cialized eld i; and 3 is the Lagrangian-multiplier for the budget constraint.
From the assumptions on Vi and on i, it follows that all -multipliers are strictly positive
and, hence, all constraints are binding, in the optimum.
Furthermore, from the assumptions on Vi and on the linearity of costs, rst-order condi-
tions are also su¢ cient to obtain a maximum.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. In the benchmark situation, when the Government asks
for the interdisciplinary research, the optimal contract solves
max
(eAI ;eBI ;A;B ;gI)
VI [YI (eAI ; eBI)]
s:t:

I = gI   CI(eAI ; eBI ; A; B)  0;
gI  G;
where the production function YI is presented in (3) and the cost function CI in (5).
For simplicity, I divide the resolution of this problem in two steps:
- 1st step: optimal (eAI ; eBI ; gI) :
The rst-order conditions to obtain the optimal level of inputs and the monetary reward
are: 8>>>>><>>>>>:
@VI
@YI
 @YI
@eiI
(eAI ; eBI) = 1  @CI@eiI (eAI ; eBI ; A; B);
1 = 2;
1 [gI   CI(eAI ; eBI ; A; B)] = 0;
2 (gI  G) = 0;
1  0; 2  0;
i = A;B;
where 1 is the Lagrangian-multiplier associated with the participation constraint of
the University, and 2 the multiplier associated with the budget condition. Solving
the system, I obtain results (9), (10), (11), and (12). Assumptions on the function VI ;
the linearity of the cost function in the decision variables, and the convexity of the
production technology, ensure that the conditions above are necessary and su¢ cient
for a maximum.
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- 2nd step: optimal (A; B) :
From the previous system of conditions, the optimal level of inputs can be written as a
function of the adaptative-skills. Therefore, it is also possible to write the interdiscipli-
nary output in terms of (A; B) ; as explicit in (13): Since VI is strictly increasing in yI ,
the optimal investment in the adaptative-skills must guarantee maximum production.
Take  2  0; 1
2

: Calculating the upper-envelope curve of yI (A; B) when considering
the possible combinations (A; B) ; I verify that the maximum interdisciplinary output
is achieved when:
(A; B) =
8>><>>:
(0; 0) if 0  G  
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] ;
(1; 0) if 
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ]  G 
1 
(1 ) +

1  ;
(1; 1) if G  1 
(1 ) +

1  :
Similar and symmetric results can be developed for the remaining possible values of :
Proof of Corollary 3.1. From expressions (9) and (10), it is easily veriable that a
decrease in i has a positive e¤ect on eiI ; i = A;B.
To verify how i a¤ects eiI and e

jI , j 6= i; let us consider the case of  2
 
0; 1
2

: In
the optimal solution, researcher A is the rst to acquire adaptative-skills and he does it for
G  
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] : Comparing the value for e

AI when (A; B) = (0; 0) with the one when
(A; B) = (1; 0) ; I obtain the following condition :
eAI (1; 0)  eAI (0; 0),
G (1  )2
+ A


G  
1 

(1  )
+ A
, G  1
1  ;
which is satised for G  
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] : The investment in B is interesting when G 
1 
(1 ) +

1  : To have a positive relation between Bs adaptative-skills and his level of input,
I need to guarantee that:
eBI (1; 0)  eBI (1; 1),

G  
1    1 


1  + B 

G  
1 

2
1  + B , G 
1

+

1  :
Given the domain where it is optimal to have B = 1, this condition holds.
For the remaining possible values of ; by similar reasoning, I can verify that the partici-
pation of each researcher increases when he acquires adaptative-skills. E¢ ciency arguments
support such adjustment.
As far as the e¤ect of  in ej is concerned, let us consider again the case of  2
 
0; 1
2

and the optimal decision on the acquisition of the adaptative-skills. Then, the impact that
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 has on eAI is:
@eAI (0; 0)
@
=  G (1  ) (1 + + 2A)
(+ A)
2 < 0;
@eAI (1; 0)
@
=  G (1 + A) + A
(+ A)
2 < 0;
@eAI (1; 1)
@
=   [ 2 + (2 +G) ] + A [ 1 + (2 +G) 
2]
2 (+ A)
2 ;
but since [ 2 + (2 +G) ] > 0 for G  1  
  (1  ) +

1  ;
it is su¢ cient that G >
1  22
2
to ensure that
@eAI (1; 1)
@
> 0:
The impact that  has on eBI is:
@eBI (0; 0)
@
=
G (2  + 2B)
(1  + B)2
> 0;
@eBI (1; 0)
@
=
(1  )  [G (2  ) (1  )   (3  )] + B

2G (1  )2    (3  2)
(1  )2 (1  + B)2
;
but for G  
(1  )  1  (1  )1  ;
always hold G (2  ) (1  )   (3  ) > 0
and 2G (1  )2    (3  2) > 0; so @e

BI (1; 0)
@
> 0;
@eBI (1; 1)
@
=
(2 +G) (1  )   1
(1  ) (1  + B) > 0 because in the domain G 
1  
  (1  ) +

1  ;
it is true that (2 +G) (1  )   1 > 0:
Proof of Corollary 3.2. As stated in Proposition 3.2, in the benchmark model, the
optimal solution for the interdisciplinary production is
yI (A; B) = 
G  
1 A   1  B
m1 A m

B

1 A
1 
1  
1 (1 )B

 ;
wheremA =
+A
1  ; andmB =
1 +B

: Graphically, it can be represented in terms of G, as the
upper envelope curve of the all four lines yI (0; 0) ; y

I (1; 0) ; y

I (0; 1) ; and y

I (1; 1) : As Figure
8 below shows, the relevant tresholds are G10 = 
(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] and G
11 = 1 
(1 ) +

1  :
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Figure 8: The upper envelope-curve of the di¤erent possible interdisciplinary outputs.
For A = B = ; the change in the slopes of the three upper lines due to a marginal
change in  is:
@ (slope of yI (0; 0))
@
=
@

 1
m1 A (
1
1 )
1 
mB(
1
)


@
=  (1  )1    m1 A 

1
mB




log

mA
mB

  1
mA
+
1
mB

;
@ (slope of yI (1; 0))
@
=
@

 1
m
1 mB
A (
1
)


@
=
=  

1
mA
1 


1
mB




log

mA
mB

+ 1  1
mA
+
1
mB

;
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@ (slope of yI (1; 1))
@
=
@

 1
m1 A m

B

@
=
= 

1
mA
1 


1
mB




log

mA
mB

  1
mA
+
1
mB

:
For  2  0; 1
2

;
it is true that: log

mA
mB


1  

  1
mA
+
1
mB
< 0;
therefore
@ (slope of yI (0; 0))
@
< 0;
it is true that: log

mA
mB

  1
mA
+
1
mB
< 0;
therefore
@ (slope of yI (1; 1))
@
< 0;
if log

mA
mB

+ 1  1
mA
+
1
mB
< 0;
then
@ (slope of yI (1; 0))
@
< 0:
As far as the change in the value at the origin is concerned:
@ jvalue at origin of yI (1; 0)j
@
=
@



1 
m1 A m

B(
1
)


@
=
= 
1
+ 
 1+ 

mA
mB




log

mA
mB



  1
mA
+
1
mB
+ 1 +
1
 (1  )

;
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@ jvalue at origin of yI (1; 1)j
@
=
@



1 +
1 

m1 A m

B

@
=
= 

1
mA
1 


1
mB




1  2 (1  )
 (1  )  log

mA
mB

  1  2 (1  )
 (+ )
+
1  2 (1  )
(1  ) (1  + ) +
1
(1  )2  
1
2

:
For  2  0; 1
2

;
it is true that:
8<:
1 2(1 )
(1 )  log

mA
mB

  1 2(1 )
(+)
+
+ 1 2(1 )
(1 )(1 +) +
1
(1 )2   12
9=; < 0;
therefore
@ jvalue at origin of yI (1; 1)j
@
< 0;
if

log

mA
mB

  1
mA
+
1
mB
+ 1 +
1
 (1  )

< 0;
then
@ jvalue at origin of yI (1; 0)j
@
< 0:
A variation in  also a¤ects the intersection points of the three lines, G10 and G11:
@ (G10)
@
=
@


(1 )[1 (1 )1 ]

@
=
=
 1 + (1  )2 + (2  ) 2   (1  )2  log (1  )
(1  )2  [  1 + (1  )]2 ;
@ (G11)
@
=
@

1 
(1 ) +

1 

@
=
=
 1 + 2+ 2+2     1 +  (1 +  [4 +  (  3)]) + (  1)3  log ()
(1  )2 2 (   1)2 :
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For  2  0; 1
2

;
it is true that
 1 + (1  )2 + (2  ) 2   (1  )2  log (1  ) > 0	 ,
therefore
@ (G10)
@
> 0;
it is true that
 1 + 2+ 2+2    [ 1 +  (1 +  [4 +  (  3)])+
(  1)3  log () < 0	 , therefore @ (G11)
@
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.3. When the resources and the adaptative-skills are non-
contractible, the problem of the University under specialization is
max
(eA;eB)
AB =
X
i=A;B
gi   Ci (ei)
s:t: Yi (ei)  ~yi; i = A;B;
where (~yi; gi) is dened by the Government.
The rst-order conditions of this problem are:8<:
i = i;
i: [~yi   Yi(ei)] = 0;
i  0;
i = A;B;
where i is the Lagrangian-multiplier associated with the standard required for eld i.
By denition, i > 0, which implies that in the optimum Yi(ei) = ~yi: From the production
functions (1) it follows that eUi = ~yi; i = A;B: Linearity of the production functions and of
the costs functions ensure the rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for having a
maximum.
When the University decides for the interdisciplinary project, its problem becomes
max
(eAI ;eBI ;A;B)
I = gI   CI (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)
s:t: YI (eAI ; eBI)  ~yI :
The rst-order conditions are:8><>:
I  @YI(eAI ;eBI)@eiI =
@CI(eAI ;eBI ;A;B)
@eiI
; i = A;B;
I : [~yI   YI(eAI ; eBI)] = 0;
I  0;
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where I is the Lagrangian-multiplier associated with the production requirement. By the
rst condition, I obtain I > 0. This implies that the funding-policy constraint is biding:
YI(eA; eB) = ~yI : Replacing this result into the rst condition, I obtain the expressions in
(15). Concavity of the production technology as well as linearity of the cost, make rst-
order conditions necessary and su¢ cient for a maximum.
Replacing the equilibrium solution for the inputs (15) in the cost function (5), it is
possible to derive the following prot function for interdisciplinarity:
UI (A; B) = gI  

1  A  
1  

B   ~yI  1

 [mA (1  A)]1  
 [mB (1  (1  ) B)]  1
 (1  )1  .
Comparing the value of UI (A; B) for the di¤erent cases of (A; B) = (0; 0) ; (1; 0) ; (0; 1) ;
and (1; 1) ; I obtain the conditions under which the acquisition of the adaptative-skills is
prot maximizer. For  2  0; 1
2

; this optimal pattern is
(A; B) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(0; 0) ; if gI  (1 )[1 (1 )1 ] ,
or if gI >

(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] and
~yI  
m1 A m

B(
1 
 )(
1
)

h
( 11 )
1  1
i ;
(1; 0) ; if gI 2


(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] ;
(1 )2+2(1 )
(1 )[1 ]

and
~yI >

m1 A m

B(
1 
 )(
1
)

h
( 11 )
1  1
i ;
or if gI >

(1 )[1 (1 )1 ] and
~yI 2


m1 A m

B(
1 
 )(
1
)

h
( 11 )
1  1
i ;

m1 A m

B(

1 )[(
1
)
 1]

;
(1; 1) ; if gI >
(1 )2+2(1 )
(1 )[1 ] and
~yI 2


m1 A m

B(

1 )[(
1
)
 1] ;
(gI  1   1  )
m1 A m

B

;
For  2  1
2
; 1

; similar conditions support the choice of (A; B) = (0; 0) ; (0; 1) and (1; 1) :
For  = 1
2
; the University is indi¤erent between (A; B) = (1; 0) and (0; 1) ; which means
that the choice concerns only the number of researchers with adaptative-skills.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. From the solution of the interdisciplinary problem stated in
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Proposition 3.3, I obtain the following results:
@eUAI
@A
=   ~yI

 
+ A


mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


< 0;
@eUAI
@B
=
~yI

 
1  + B 

mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


> 0;
@eUAI
@A
=
~yI

 
2
1  A 

mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


> 0;
@eUAI
@B
=   ~yI

 (1  )
1  (1  )B 

mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


< 0:
The global e¤ect of  on As input is:
@eUAI
@
=
~yI



log

mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


 
 
3  1 
1 A  

1 (1 )B
1    

+ A
  1
mB
)



mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


:
A su¢ cient condition for having a negative relation between eUAI and  is:
mB
mA


1  (1  )B
1  A



1  


< 1, (1  A)mA
[1  (1  )B]mB >
1  

:
Similar expressions can be found for comparative statics on eUBI :
Proof of Corollary 3.4. Given the Universitys best choice for the interdiscipli-
nary resources
 
eUAI ; e
U
BI ; A; B

stated in Proposition 3.3, it is straightforward to derive the
maximum interdisciplinary prot expression and then to calculate the following derivatives:
@UI
@A
(A; B) =   ~yI

 (mA)   (1  A)1  
 [mB (1  (1  ) B)] 
"
1  


+


1  
1 #
< 0;
@UI
@B
(A; B) =   ~yI

 [mA (1  A)]1   (mB) 1 
 [1  (1  ) B] 
"
1  


+


1  
1 #
< 0:
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For general values of the parameters, the nal e¤ect of  in the interdisciplinary prot is
ambiguous, since:
@UI
@
(0; 0) =
~yI



mB
mA



1
1  
2 


1



 f 1  A + (+ A)  [log (mA)  log (mB)+
+ log

1
1  

  log

1


+
1 + B
1  + B

:
Nevertheless, when A = B =  and  2
 
0; 1
2

; it is possible to conclude that:
i) for (A; B) = (0; 0) :
@UI
@
(A; B) < 0;
ii) for (A; B) = (1; 0) :
@MUI
@
(1; 0) =   1
(1  )2 +
~yI



mB
mA



1
1  



1



 f 1  A + (+ A)  [log (mA)  log (mB) 
  log

1


+
1
mB

:
This means that if log

mB
mA
1


> 
1 + , then
@UI
@
(1; 0) < 0;
iii) for (A; B) = (1; 1) :
@UI
@
(1; 1) =
1
2
  1
(1  )2 +
~yI



mB
mA



1
1  


 f 1  A + (+ A)  [log (mA)  log (mB)  2+
+
1 + B
1  + B

from what I conclude that log

mB
mA

>  2+ 1+
1 +  1+++
1
2
  1
(1 )2
~yI

mBm
1 
A
=) @UI
@
(1; 1) < 0:
Proof of Corollary 3.5. From the prot maximizer behavior of the University stated in
Proposition 3.3, I obtain that, once deciding for one type of research, the University exactly
matches the required standard. The result of this corollary then follows straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. To obtain the Sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium so-
lution, I rst concentrate in the problem of the University when choosing the resources
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and the investment on the adaptative-skills. Considering the specialized projects, the prot
maximizing choice for the resources is given by
max
(eA;eB)
AB = 2g  
X
i=A;B
Ci (ei)
s:t: Yi (ei)  ~y; i = A;B;
from which I obtain the solution eUi = ~y, and the prot value 
U
i = g   ~y; i = A;B: Under
Assumption 2, the University never considers the scenario of developing only one specialized
project, since either develops both A and B, or no one of them.
Considering the interdisciplinary eld, the amount chosen for the inputs and the acqui-
sition of the adaptative-skills solves
max
(eAI ;eBI ;A;B)
I = g   CI (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)
s:t: YI (eAI ; eBI)  ~y:
The optimal solutions are similar to the ones presented in Proposition 3.3. Again, if choosing
interdisciplinarity, the University does not produce above the standard.
For the policymaker, the restriction of having an unique funding rule makes the choice of
interdisciplinarity or specialization a non-contractible decision. This means that, if the Gov-
ernment wishes to induce the choice of the interdisciplinary eld, the best possible funding
rule (~y; g) solves:
max
(~y;g)
VI [YI (eAI ; eBI)]
s:t:
8>>><>>>:
I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)  0;
I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)  AB (eA; eB) ;
2g  G;
eiI = eiI (~y) ;
i = A;B;
where eiI (~y) is the solution of the prot maximization problem of the University under
interdisciplinarity, and AB (eA; eB) is the maximum value of the specialized choice, obtained
from the problem of the University for specialization. Given the linearity of the cost function
and the strict convexity of the interdisciplinary technology, the necessary and su¢ cient
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conditions to obtain a maximum are:8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
@VI
@YI
 @YI
@~yI
(~y) + (1 + 2)  @I@~y (~y)  2  @AB@~y = 0;
(1 + 2)  @Ig   2  @AB@g   23 = 0;
1  I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B) = 0;
2  [AB (eA; eB)  I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)] = 0;
3  (2g  G) = 0;
1  0; 2  0; 3  0:
From the rst condition, I obtain
1 + 2 > 0;
and from the second condition,
3 =
1   2
2
:
Considering the fact that all Lagrangian-multipliers i; i = 1; 2; 3; are non-negative, I con-
clude that:
1 > 0;
2  0:
Therefore, in the optimal situation,
I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B) = 0, g = CI (eAI ; eBI ; A; B) ;
I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)  AB (eA; eB) :
As far as the budget constraint is concerned, in the optimal I may have
3 > 0 =) 2g = G;
or 3 = 0 =) 2g  G:
Nevertheless, when the Governmental budget G is not exhausted, the other two constraints
must be active:
2g < G =) 3 = 0 =) 1 = 2:
Since 1 > 0; it must be that 2 > 0; and therefore I = 0 and I = AB:
For the case of  2  0; 1
2

; depending on the value of the parameters in our model, four
alternative situations are possible:
situation 1, when (1 )
[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
(1 )1+  2m1 A mB ; the comparison between the prot
functions under specialization and interdisciplinarity rely on two tresholds, ~y00AB;I =
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g
2 m1 A mB( 1)

( 11 )
1  and ~y11 =
(g  1   1  )
m1 A m

B
; as Figure 9 below shows.
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Figure 9: Specialized prot (AB) and
interdisciplinary prot (I), in situation 1.
For ~y 2  0; ~y00AB;I ; specialization is the best choice of the University. For ~y 2 
~y00AB;I ; ~y
11

; it prefers the interdisciplinary project.
Anticipating this behavior, the Government sets ~y = ~y11 if it wants to induce interdis-
ciplinarity, or ~y = ~y00AB;I if it prefers specialization. To know which of the alternative
scenarios is actually chosen by the policy-maker, I must compare the value of VI (~y11)
with VAB =
P
i=A;B Vi
 
~y00AB;I

;
situation 2, when 1 [2 (2 
) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2  2m1 A mB 
(1 )[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
(1 )1+ ; Figure 10
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represents the comparison between the two types of prot, I and AB.
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Figure 10: Specialized prot (AB) and
interdisciplinary prot (I), in situation 2.
The University prefers the specialized projects when ~y 2  0; ~y10AB;I ; where ~y10AB;I =
(g+ 1 )
2 m1 A mB( 1)
 : It prefers the interdisciplinary project when ~y 2  ~y10AB;I ; ~y11 :
Predicting this optimal reaction, the Government sets ~y = ~y11 or ~y = ~y10AB;I , depending
on whether it values more VI (~y11) or VAB =
P
i=A;B Vi
 
~y10AB;I

; respectively:
situation 3, when 2g(1 )
(2+g)(1 ) 1  2m1 A mB 
1 [2 (2 ) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2 ; Figure 11 shows how
to compare the protability of both types of projects. Here the relevant treshold for
the standard is ~y11AB;I =
(g+ 1 +
1 
 )
2 m1 A mB
:
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Figure 11: Specialized prot (AB) and
interdisciplinary prot (I), in situation 3.
It then follows that the specialized projects are chosen when ~y 2  0; ~y11AB;I ; and the
interdisciplinary project is preferred when ~y 2  ~y11AB;I ; ~y11 :
The optimal policy is, therefore, to establish ~y = ~y11 if the Government prefers inter-
disciplinarity, and ~y = ~y11AB;I if it prefers specialization. This preference is determined
by comparing VI (~y11) with VAB =
P
i=A;B vi
 
~y11AB;I

:
situation 4, when 2
m1 A m

B
 2g(1 )
(2+g)(1 ) 1 ; the University never chooses the interdiscipli-
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nary project, as I can conclude from Figure 12 below.
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Figure 12: Specialized prot (AB) and
interdisciplinary prot (I), in situation 4.
The University prefers the specialized research whenever ~y 2  0; ~yS ; and decides
for its outside option of no research, otherwise. As a consequence, the Government
establishes ~y = ~yS:
In all the 4 situations above, whenever interdisciplinarity is a possible best-alternative
(situations 1 to 3), I verify that it is actually so, only if the required standard is su¢ ciently
high (above ~y00AB;I ; ~y
10
AB;I , or ~y
11
AB;I ; respectively), but not too much (at most ~y
11).
Consider again the previous situation 3. In particular, let ~y11AB;I = ~y
11: This gure enables
us to discuss the case where it is not optimal to exhaust the budget G and why it implies
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that the incentive-compatibility constraint I (eAI ; eBI ; A; B)  AB (eA; eB) is binding.
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Figure 13: Specialized prot (AB) and
interdisciplinary prot (I), in a particular
situation 3.
In this case, if to induce ~y = ~y11 the Government still has g < G
2
; the budget exhausting is
not compatible with the choice for interdisciplinarity. An increase in g has a higher e¤ect on
AB than on I (2@g versus @g) and, as a consequence, trying to employ all the monetary
resources makes specialization the optimal decision for the University.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. From the proof of Proposition 3.4, it is possible to
conclude that, when  2  0; 1
2

; the comparison between specialized and interdiscipli-
nary prots depends on how the parameters ratio 2
m1 A m

B
compares with the 3 thresholds
(1 )[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
(1 )1+ ,
1 [2 (2 ) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2 , and
2g(1 )
(2+g)(1 ) 1 :
An increase in  a¤ects positively the ratio 2
m1 A m

B
:
@

2
m1 A m

B

@
=
2 (1 + 2)m 2A
m1+B
> 0:
Since no threshold depends on  and because the thresholds have a clear order:
(1 )[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
(1 )1+  1 [2 (2 
) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2 
2g(1 )
(2+g)(1 ) 1 , an increase in the parame-
ters ratio favors the choice of interdisciplinarity. That is to say, an increase in  expands
the range of ~y where interdisciplinarity is more protable than specialization.
Since  only a¤ects the interdisciplinary prot, I only need the comparative statics results
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obtained in Corollary 3.4. Therefore, when  2  0; 1
2

;
for (A; B) = (0; 0) :
@I
@
(A; B) < 0;
for (A; B) = (1; 0) : log

mB
mA
1


>

1  +  =)
@I
@
(A; B) < 0;
for (A; B) = (1; 1) : log

mB
mA

>  2 + 1 + 
1  +   
1 + 
+ 
+
+
1
2
  1
(1 )2
~yI

mBm
1 
A
=) @I
@
(A; B) < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.6. When A = B,  > 1; each situation described in the
proof of Proposition 3.4 gives place to 2 alternative scenarios (so in total I end up with 8
possible situations), depending on whether the kink in the specialized prot curve occurs
above or below the interdisciplinary prot curve. In the rst case, the relevant alternatives
for the University are the specialization in both A and B, only in B, or the interdisciplinarity.
In the second case, the option for B alone is never actually considered and everything remains
the same as when A = B. To illustrate, I show two of the eight possible situations:
situation 2.1, when 1 [2 (2 
) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2  2m1 A mB 
(1 )[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
(1 )1+ and the
specialization in eld B alone is never optimal. The University prefers specialization
in A and B if ~y 2  0; ~y10AB;I ; and prefers interdisciplinarity if ~y 2  ~y10AB;I ; ~y11. Figure
43
14 below represents the situation.
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Figure 14: Prot comparison, specialization
and interdisciplinarity, when A > B; and
B alone is never optimal.
situation 2.2, when 1 [2 (2 
) g(1 )(1 )]
(1 )2  2m1 A mB 
(1 )[g(1 )+] g(1 )2
(1 )1+ and the
specialization in eld B alone is optimal for ~y 2

g
A
; ~y10B;I

; whereas both A and B
are chosen for ~y 2

0; g
A

and interdisciplinarity for ~y 2  ~y10B;I ; ~y11 ; with ~y10B;I =

1 
B m1 A mB( 1)
 : Figure 15 represents the situation.
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Figure 15: Prot comparison, specialization and interdisciplinarity,
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when A > B and B alone is a possible optimal choice.
The impact of i on the choice between specialization and interdisciplinarity can now be
analyzed as follows:
a) in the case where B alone is never optimal choice
@

(A+B)
m1 A m

B

@A
=
 (1  ) [ (1 + A)  (1  )B]
(+ A)
2

mA
mB

which is > 0 when
1 + A
B
>
1  

;
@

(A+B)
m1 A m

B

@B
=
 (1  ) [(1  ) (1 + B)  A]
(+ A) (1  + B)

mA
mB

which is > 0 when
1 + B
A
>

1  :
With an increase in A, it may happen that B alone may become a relevant alternative,
since it is not a¤ected by that change of ine¢ ciency.
b) in the case where B may be a relevant option for intermediate values of the standard:
@~y10B;I
@A
=
 (1  ) 1+mAmB
[ (  1) mAB + (+ A)mB]2
> 0;
@~y10B;I
@B
=  

h
  1

m1 A m
 1+
B
i
(1  )
h
B   1m1 A mB
i2 < 0;
for  >
1

m1 A m
 1+
B :
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